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This paper aims at distinguishing long-run and short-run constraints in the access to private health care 
services. To this end, we apply the methodology proposed by Carneiro and Heckman (2003) to the 
SHARE database, a survey conducted in a number of European countries, involving some 22,000 
individuals over the age of 50. Micro-data includes information on health and health consumption, and 
socioeconomic variables (like income and wealth). Our results show that the problem of short-run 
constraints in the access to private health care services could be real, especially in Italy, Greece, and to 
some extent Spain. Moreover, there appear to be differences in the role of credit constraints, both 
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1. Introduction 
 
The presence of extensive and persistent health inequalities (i.e. the fact that individuals 
in equal need but different in terms of socio-economic characteristics are not treated as 
equal) has been emphasised by a strand of the health economics literature since long 
ago, both considering self-perceived health status and access to care (see e.g. Gwatkin, 
2000, or Anand et al., 2006). Started by investigating inequality in Europe and the U.S., 
the evidence is now becoming available also for developing countries and for countries 
in transition. From a policy point of view - given these persistent health inequalities, 
and a commonly agreed ethical concept that individuals in equal need ought to be 
treated equally – it is crucial to move beyond, and ask about the role different 
determinants may play in influencing the health status or the access to care. Taking this 
view, the literature has identified the key role played by income and, more generally, 
socio-economic conditions (in this sense, e.g. Wagstaff, 2002). In particular, there 
seems to be a close relationship at the individual level between income inequality and 
health inequality, well known in the literature as the “income (or social) health gradient” 
(e.g. van Doorslaer et al., 1997; Marmot, 2006; Daniels et al., 2006). However, as 
pointed out e.g. by Deaton (2003) or Wilkinson and Marmot (2003), personal income 
and socio-economic status could be a proxy for many other factors, such as the lack of 
minimal health care knowledge or a disadvantaged social environment, that – in turn – 
may be the underlying “true” causes of the inadequate access to health care services, or 
of the adoption of unhealthy lifestyles, both conducive to poorer health conditions. But 
while income may constrain the access to services in the short-run, because poorer 
individuals may not have enough funds to access services - both for indirect costs (such 
as transportation), as well as direct costs (also in the form of co-payment to publicly 
provided services) - all the other factors just mentioned can be labelled as “long-run 
constraints” in the access to medical care, since they cannot be removed by a simple 
policy of cash transfers to poor individuals. Indeed, the policy suggestions to tackle the 
problems raised by health inequalities will differ in the two cases, so that it is important 
to understand which are the prevailing constraints in impeding poorer individuals to get 
access to health care services in order to design effective policy actions.   3
This paper aims at distinguishing and quantifying the role of long-run and short-
run credit constraints in the access to private health care services. The importance of 
credit constraints for this particular type of services has been recently emphasised e.g. 
by Decker and Remler (2004), who study how the size of the income gradient between 
Canada and US varies with age, pointing out the role of universal health insurance 
provided by Medicare in reducing the gap after the age of 65. Here we concentrate on a 
group of selected European countries, where most of the health services are publicly 
provided almost free of charge, and the problem of credit constraints should be – in 
principle – just minimal. We depart from methodologies applied in the analysis of the 
causes of health inequalities so far (e.g. Marmot et al., 2001; Wagstaff et al., 2003), 
borrowing from a paper by Carneiro and Heckman (2003) (CH from now on) centred on 
the choice of getting on to college. The basic idea is to split the whole population in 
healthy people and those who are ill and, for each sub-group, study the access to private 
health services in each income quartile. The identifying assumption is that people 
belonging to the highest income quartile are – by definition - not facing any short-run 
constraints. Hence, we can measure the proportion of constrained individuals with 
respect to this benchmark. We can differentiate log-run and short-run constrained 
individuals by controlling for other determinants of the demand for private services, like 
age, the level of education, lifestyles and habits, the type of job, and so on. This 
methodology is applied to the SHARE database, a Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe conducted in a number of selected European countries (ranging 
from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean), involving some 22,000 individuals over the 
age of 50 (see Börsch- Supan and Jürges, 2005, for more information). Micro-data 
includes information on health and health consumption, and socioeconomic variables 
(like income and wealth). 
Contrary to expectations, our results show that the problem of short-run 
constraints in the access to private health care services could be real also in countries 
with a universal coverage publicly provided, like Italy, where at least some 10% of all 
consumers of health services can be constrained in some way, and 50% of these 
“constrained” individuals (both in the long- and the short-run) can be “credit 
constrained”. Moreover, the role of the long- and the short-run factors seems to be   4
different for the various services we consider here. In particular, short-run constraints 
seem to play a larger role in the case of dental care and visits at specialist physicians. 
All main results are robust to different definitions of income and the inclusion of 
additional regressors in the model. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we 
review the available evidence on health inequalities and on their origins, discussing the 
methodologies proposed so far in the applied health economics literature, and then 
presenting the methodology employed by CH. Our empirical exercise on SHARE data 
follows. A section of concluding remarks and policy suggestions ends the paper. 
 
 
2. Health inequalities and their causes 
 
The available evidence. Health inequalities have been shown to exist in many different 
dimensions, and specifically: a) in different countries (developed and less developed 
countries, countries in transition); b) using different concepts and measures for health 
(self-assessed health status and more objective measures of health); c) different 
categories of health consumption (General Practitioner visits, outpatient and inpatient 
care utilisation, dental care visits); and d) considering individuals at different ages. 
Inequalities are generally identified by ranking people by an indicator of socio-
economic status (for instance, income, wealth, or consumption), and by showing that 
poorer individuals are also disadvantaged in terms of health (i.e. they report worst 
health conditions than better off individuals) or health care consumption (i.e. they are 
less prone to access to services than better off individuals). All the comparisons are 
generally conducted by controlling for most of the factors that are likely to influence 
individuals’ need (such as age, gender, level of education, lifestyles or habits), so that 
measured inequalities are computed by equalising needs across the whole population
1. 
Wagstaff (2002), in his review of the literature on poverty and health sector 
inequalities, suggests four main conclusions: a) inequalities are almost always to the 
disadvantage of the poor; b) inequalities are more pronounced for objective indicators of 
                                                 
1 On this point, see below the discussion about methodological issues.   5
health, than for self-assessed measures; c) measured inequalities show large variations 
across countries, depending on the indicators of health and socioeconomic status used; 
d) inequalities seem to be widening in the last years. That inequalities are almost always 
to the disadvantage of the poor is of course worrisome for policy makers, since poorer 
people are already disadvantaged by their economic situation; and, most probably - as 
suggested by Wagstaff (2002) - the causality between poverty and ill-health is running 
in both directions. In fact, e.g. Van Doorslaer et al. (1997) suggest that there is a close 
relationship between income inequality and health inequality, in a sample of European 
countries and the U.S. And this – in turn – can help explain why both income and health 
inequalities are widening in the last years. 
That health inequalities are favouring the rich is however a very simple 
statement that necessitate some specifications. For instance, considering the self-
assessed health status, in a huge effort to compare different countries, Van Doorslaer et 
al. (1997) show that there are substantial variations in inequalities across a number of 
developed countries, with the largest levels of inequality observed in the U.S. and U.K., 
and the smallest reported for East Germany, Finland, and Sweden. In a companion 
paper, Van Doorslaer et al. (2000) analyse inequality in the access to care, by 
considering the imputed value of the actual reported utilisation of three different types 
of care (GP visits, outpatient visits and inpatient care, while dental care was excluded 
since the available indicators of need were not able to identify those for this particular 
type of services). Findings show a different pattern of inequalities for the three different 
services, with little or no inequalities in visiting a GP, inequalities favouring the better 
off in the use of outpatient care, and inequalities favouring the lower-income groups as 
for inpatient care. Almost all these results are confirmed by Van Doorslaer and Masseria 
(2004), considering a wider set of OECD countries - ranging from Europe to U.S., from 
Australia to Mexico - and analysing both the probability and the frequency of usage. In 
fact, while findings for GP and specialists closely mirror those by Van Doorslaer et al. 
(2000), more equivocal evidence is found for inpatient care utilisation; moreover, for 
dental care a pro-rich distribution is uncovered. Similar patterns - for the cross-country 
differences and the different services usage - emerge also for a group of developing   6
countries and countries in transition (for a very simple analysis, Makinen et al., 2000); 
but the analyses suffer for the low quality of the data available. 
An additional specification about the studies on health inequalities needs to be 
made for the life-cycle component of the observed inequities. As Deaton and Paxson 
(1998) has pointed out, the correlation between income and health status varies with 
age, being small early in life, then becoming steadily larger up to late middle age, to 
weaken again after the age of 60
2. One possible interpretation - pointed out by authors – 
is based on the causality running from health to income: health shocks after retirement 
do not affect earnings, since most of those incomes come from pensions; on the 
contrary, health shocks can heavily affect earnings before retirement. 
 
Unravelling the causes of health inequalities. Given the substantial evidence on the 
existence of health inequalities to the disadvantage of the poor, in a policy perspective it 
is important to move one step forward, asking about the causes of such inequities. One 
can think of several different factors affecting individual health status or individual 
access to care. One such determinants is of course current socioeconomic status (SES), 
proxied by income, consumption or employment. A lower SES could be associated to a 
lower access to care (because of both direct and indirect costs) and this, in turn, could be 
the cause of a worst health status with respect to richer individuals. But there might be 
other determinants, such as for example the level of education, the family background 
and early life circumstances, current lifestyles and habits, stressful working and social 
conditions, or the availability of good quality health care facilities at the local level. All 
these causes have become known as the “social determinants” of health, and there 
already is evidence that they do play a role in influencing health inequalities (see 
Wilkinson and Marmot, 2003 about the “solid facts” on the social determinants of 
health). Following CH, in this paper we classify these determinants in short-run and 
long-run factors affecting health inequities. In particular, we define short-run constraints 
as those that can be removed by a simple policy of cash transfers; on the contrary, long-
run constraints remain unaffected by such a policy, and need different policy actions to 
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be taken. In this perspective, current SES/income seems to be the only factor affecting 
health inequalities in the short-run, being itself a proxy for short-run credit constraints; 
all the other factors appear to be instead “long-run constraints” in influencing health 
equalities
3. 
While the literature on the existence of health inequalities is abundant, however, 
results on the relative importance of the causes of such inequalities are not easily 
available, and generally do not distinguish between short- and long-run effects. For 
instance, in a paper aimed at establishing causal links between SES and health status, 
using a sample of elderly aged 70 and older in the U.S., Adams et al. (2003) find some 
evidence on the role of ability-to-pay in influencing access to treatment only for mental 
and chronic illnesses. Their interpretation is that only for procedures not covered by 
Medicare, there is some scope for short-run constraints. But this reading has been 
challenged by Adda et al. (2003), applying the same causality test to Sweden and the 
UK Whitehall II study, two countries with universal coverage. In a paper concentrating 
exactly on the Whitehall II study, a sample of British civil servants originally located in 
London, Marmot et al. (2001) try instead to understand whether current SES is more 
important than other measures of social status earlier in life in explaining morbidity 
attributable to three types of disease: coronary disease, chronic bronchitis, and 
depression. Authors’ findings imply that current SES in adulthood is more important 
than father’s social class to predict adult morbidity (i.e. short-run constraints seem to 
prevail on long-run ones). They also suggest that these results are consistent with a 
“pathway” model in which early life disadvantages affect adult circumstances, rather 
than disease risk directly. Similar evidence is found also by Currie and Hyson (1999), 
studying the impact of Low Birthweight (LBW) on SES. LBW impacts well into 
adulthood, affecting educational attainments, self-assessed health status and 
employment. Moreover, children from households with a low SES suffer both from the 
effects of their social status and the effects of LBW. In a more technically oriented 
                                                 
3 One can notice that also current behaviours (e.g. smoking or heavy alcohol use) affects health in the 
short-run, because bad consequences on health can simply be removed by eliminating the unhealthy 
behaviours. However, lifestyles are highly correlated with education, and should then be classified among 
the long-run causes of health inequalities. In a similar vein, see the discussion in Daniels et al. (2006), in 
particular section 4.3.   8
paper, Wagstaff et al. (2003) study the determinants of inequalities in child malnutrition 
in Vietnam. Their results suggest that the main causes of inequities are household 
consumption, and regional fixed effects (gauging differences among regions in terms 
e.g. of resources for health care, hospitals, and other health infrastructures and 
technologies). Other factors found to contribute to inequalities are drinking water, 
sanitation and parental schooling, but their effects appear to be fairly small. Applying 
the same methodology as in Wagstaff et al. (2003), Van Doorslaer and Masseria (2004) 
found that needs (i.e. all morbidity and demographic variables), income, education and 
activity status, as well as regional disparities and the private health insurance coverage, 
are all playing a role in explaining the observed inequalities in health services usage of 
three different types of services in different OECD countries. In particular, income in 
itself is not the single most important factor, since education appear to be a key 
determinant of a pro-rich distribution in many instances, whereas work-activity status 
contributes to a pro-poor distribution. However, the author emphasise that these 
findings are not common to all countries considered in the study, and the characteristics 
of the national health system are important for a proper understanding. 
 
Methodological issues. Before moving to the empirical section of the paper and 
presenting the method proposed by CH, in this section we discuss some methodological 
issues, and develop an unifying framework in the spirit of Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 
(2000). We analyse the main methodologies proposed in the literature in order to solve 
two distinct problems, i.e. how to properly measure health inequalities, and how to 
decompose the observed inequalities in their underlying causes. The problem of a 
proper measurement of health inequalities originate from the stylised facts that poor 
people are both more likely to report a worst health status and more likely to report a 
higher consumption of health care services, so that studying health inequalities without 
“equalising” needs across individuals may end up with unequal distributions favouring 
the poor. Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000) discuss two methodologies to compute 
need-standardised medical care figures: the direct standardisation approach and the 
indirect standardisation approach. To simplify the discussion, let consider a very simple 
economy, in which the total population of N individuals can be divided into two sub-  9
groups by income (Y) - the poor (P) and the rich (R) – and two sub-groups by health 
status (S) – the healthy (H) and the ill (I). The direct standardisation approach is based 
on the computation of need-standardised medical care figures m
+ for each income 
















Y represents the mean quantities of care received in income group Y=(P,R) by 
persons in need category S=(H,I). Of course, in the presence of horizontal equity (i.e. 





R. To assess the degree of health inequalities, one can compare - for each 
income sub-group - the share of standardised medical care with its population share, and 
refer to standard tools as concentration curves and indices. While the direct approach 
considers income groups, the indirect standardisation approach works out a figure for 
each individual in the economy indicating the amount of medical care she would have 
received if she had been treated like others in the same health need category. In other 
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I; i.e., it must be true that healthy (ill) poor and 
healthy (ill) rich are treated like every other healthy (ill) individual in the economy. 
Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000) has shown that computation of m
+ and m* can be 
easily arranged by regressing for each income sub-group the actual demand for care m 
on a set of regressors x, to be chosen as the best proxies for the individual’s need for 
medical care; hence, these regressions are not to be interpreted as behavioural models, 
rather as simple devices to compute our variables of interest, and endogeneity is not an   10
issue here. Just to illustrate, consider for example the direct standardization approach
4; 
we need to estimate the following regression model for each income sub-group 
Y=(P,R): 
∑ + + + = i Y Y i u DHS x m δ β α   (3) 
where DHS is a dummy variable indicating the health status S (equal to 1 when the i-th 
individual is ill). Predicted values from Eq. (3) can be easily interpreted as the mean 
quantities of care m
S
Y received by each income sub-group (evaluated at the sample 
means of the vector x): 
[]
H
Y Y Y i m x DHS m E = + = = ∑β α ˆ ˆ 0 | 
[]
I
Y Y Y i m x DHS m E = + + = = ∑ δ β α ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 | 
(4) 
Results of Eq. (4) form the basis for calculating concentration curves and concentration 
indices. 
Having measured properly health inequalities, a second problem to be solved is 
how to decompose the observed inequities into their determinants, a point particularly 
interesting for policy making purposes. One simple methodology used e.g. by Marmot 
et al. (2001) and Kunst et al. (2005) relies on computing odds ratios using logistic 
regressions, and comparing results for different population sub-groups. For instance, in 
their study on the causes of inequalities in adult morbidity for three types of disease 
using the Whitehall II data, Marmot et al. (2001) adjust observed probabilities by 
considering both age and current employment grade in a logistic regression model, and 
then compute odds ratios for different population sub-groups identified by father’s 
social class, height, and age at leaving full time education (the potential determinants of 
observed inequities). The importance of each one of these determinants is assessed by 
looking at how odds vary within the relevant sub-group. A more sophisticated approach 
has been proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003), and is based on the decomposition of a 
concentration index C, computed on the observed distribution of a measure of health 
status or health care use, into two components: a deterministic one and a residual. For 
simplicity, we consider again the previous framework, where m measure access to care. 
                                                 
4 For more details on the indirect standardization approach, see the original work by Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer (2000).   11
Wagstaff et al. (2003) suggest to run a regression of the type of Eq. (3) above on the 
whole sample, in order to obtain estimates of the relevant β’s, measuring the marginal 
effect on the access to care for each of the determinants included in vector x. 
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(5) 
where Ck is a concentration index computed on the k-th regressor x, GCε is a generalised 
concentration index for ε
5, and all other variables are defined as before. The first part of 
the RHS in Eq. (5) represents the deterministic component, whilst the last part is the 
residual one, i.e. the part of health inequalities that cannot be accounted for by 
systematic variations in the x’s. Notice that the importance of a given regressor in 
influencing inequalities depends on three different factors: a) the importance of the 
variable, measured by its mean; b) its distribution with respect to SES, measured by the 
regressor-specific concentration index; c) its marginal effect on the access to care. To 
illustrate the differences with the approach proposed by CH, we now turn to the 
empirical section of the paper. 
 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
 
In this section we discuss our empirical analysis, aimed at identifying long-run and 
short-run constraints in the access to private health care services in a sample of 






                                                 
5 In particular, GCε is analogous to the Gini coefficient corresponding to a generalised Lorenz curve, and 







ε ε , where Ri reflects the fractional rank of the i-th individual in the 
income distribution. We refer to the original paper for more details.   12
3.1. The methodology 
 
The methodology used in this paper is borrowed from CH, who studied the role of 
credit constraint in influencing the choice of attending a college, that together with 
health services contributes building human capital. It has been widely applied in the 
literature on schooling, since understanding college gaps across income quintiles is a 
key factor in defining efficient and effective policies for human capital formation, hence 
for long-term economic growth (see e.g. Aakvik et al., 2005 for Norway; Dearden et al., 
2004 for UK). On the contrary, to the best of our knowledge, it has never been 
considered before in the case of health services, even though also health care is a long-
run factor affecting growth. 
Consider again the framework sketched above, where m denote now access to 
private health care services. For each population sub-group defined by health status 
S=(H,I), we run the following regression: 
∑ ∑ + + + = i
Y
S S i u Q x m δ β α   (6) 
where the x’s identify as before a vector of relevant variables to explain demand for 
private health care services, and Q
Y are dummy variables for the first three income 
quartiles Y=1,2,3. Notice that Eq. (6) is quite close to the regression used in the direct 
standardisation approach proposed by Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000), where 
population sub-groups where instead defined on income. Predicted values from Eq. (6) 
can be interpreted as demands for private care “adjusted” for long-term factors in each 
income quartile for all population sub-groups by health status: 
[]
4 ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 | S S S
Y





i m x Q m E ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 | = + + = = ∑ δ β α  
(7) 
To identify “credit-constrained” individuals we then assume that people belonging to 
the fourth income quartile are not constrained by definition. Hence, we can measure 
differences in means with respect to the “reference” quartile (the fourth quartile), and 
interpret these “gaps” as proxies for the share of people constrained. Clearly, we expect 
all the δ’s to be negative. For each population sub-group of healthy and ill people, we 
compute two types of “gaps”, both using “adjusted” and “unadjusted” means:   13
Y
S S Y m m p a G ˆ ˆ ˆ
4
, 4 − =  
Y
S S Y m m Gap − =
4
, 4  
(8) 
The total shares of constrained individuals can be easily obtained by summing up 
“gaps” across income quartiles. The share of short-run (credit) constrained individuals 
in the access to private care is represented by the total share computed using “adjusted” 
means, i.e. after controlling for all factors affecting the demand for private care like 
education or lifestyles. The share of long-run constrained individuals is represented by 
what is left after removing short-run constrained individuals from the total share 
computed using “unadjusted” means. 
 
3.2. The exercise 
 
Data and variables definition. The data we use come from the Survey of health, ageing 
and retirement in Europe (SHARE), conducted in 2003 on about 15,000 households and 
22,000 individuals of ten European countries: Italy, France, Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Sweden (see Börsch- Supan and 
Jürges, 2005). In order to participate to the survey, at least one member of each 
household had to be aged 50 or older. The survey is particularly useful for our purposes, 
since it contains for almost all countries detailed information on income, wealth, socio-
economic characteristics, health conditions and utilisation of health services. We do not 
consider the data for Germany and Austria since the information on the use of private 
health services is missing. We exclude also Switzerland, given the high number of 
missing data for the same variable. 
The main variable of interest m we study here is a dummy indicating whether a 
person purchased private health services during the last twelve months. In particular, the 
questionnaire asks individuals whether they received any types of care from private 
providers that they paid out of pocket or through a private insurance because they would 
have waited too long or they could not get as much as they needed in the National 
Health System. Notice that the variable m does not include private providers producing 
for the National Health System, but only services for which patients are not reimbursed   14
by the public insurance scheme. Moreover, it already takes into account the possibility 
that the choice of opting out for private services could depend on the presence of 
waiting lists in the public service. Types of services include: surgery, care from a 
general practitioner, care from a specialist physician, drugs, dental care, hospital and 
ambulatory rehabilitation, home care, care in a nursing home. 
People are divided into two health status groups S on the basis of a question on 
self-assessed health status: the “healthy” (H) are those who answered that their 
perceived health status is good or very good, while the “ill” (I) are those who stated that 
their conditions are less than good. The distinction between healthy and non healthy 
persons is important since these two groups may be led by very different motivations in 
their demand for health services. The vector x in Equation (6) is defined in accordance 
with the literature on the demand for private health care (see e.g. Propper, 2000; 
Harmon and Nolan, 2001). In particular, we included a set of family and structural 
variables that may influence the demand for private health services over the long-run, 
like age, education, gender, current and past occupation, the presence of a private 
insurance, possibly dangerous lifestyles as drinking or smoking, and family size. We 
also consider among our regressors variables measuring the time an individual had to 
wait before obtaining the service consumed. 
 
The demand for private health services. We take a gradual approach for disentangling 
long-run and short-run constraints. We start by asking: a) whether healthy people 
purchase more or less private health services than those in bad health conditions, 
irrespective of their income or wealth; b) if there is a differential access to private health 
services according to the household economic resources, irrespective of self-rated health 
status. We then proceed by implementing the CH approach asking, in the case there is a 
share of the population that does not purchase private health services, whether this 
depends on short-run liquidity constraints or on structural long-run behavioural 
characteristics of the household. 
Table 1 shows the “unadjusted” percentage of people that purchased private 
health services in the various countries, distinguishing between healthy and ill 
individuals. In almost all countries the probability of using private health services is   15
greater for those in bad health conditions. But while in some countries the percentage 
difference among the two groups of people is very low (Sweden, Italy, France), in 
others (Netherlands, Denmark, Greece) the difference is much bigger. Notice that these 
percentages refer to the use of private services during the last twelve months before the 
interview. Of course, had we considered a greater time span, we would have obtained 
higher values, since the probability of becoming ill and needing a doctor tends to 
increase with the length of the time period considered. At the limit, if we consider 
private and public services together, it is clear that the probability of using at least one 
health service is 100% for every person. If we restrict the attention only to private 
services it is not certain that this probability will tend to 100% for everyone, but it is 
surely positively correlated with the length of the period examined. This means that, 
since we are working on a cross-section, our estimates provide a lower bound for the 
share of constrained individuals. Taking into account all countries, the sample share of 
individuals accessing private services (both healthy and ill) is about one fourth of the 
total number of individuals, reflecting the fact that most services in European countries 
are publicly financed. Highest fractions are found in Greece and the Netherlands 
(respectively 38,2% and 37,1%); the lowest numbers are recorded for Italy, Spain and 
France (respectively 23,7%, 22,8% and 24,2%). 
 
Tab. 1 Proportion of people using private health services during last 12 months, 
by stated health conditions 
 
  Ill Healthy All 
Sweden 15.9%  15.8%  15.8% 
Denmark 20.7%  11.6%  14.4% 
Netherlands 22.7%  14.4%  17.1% 
France 13.0%  11.2%  11.9% 
Spain 12.2%  10.6%  11.4% 
Italy 12.2%  11.5%  11.9% 
Greece 21.7%  16.5%  18.5% 
All countries  13.8%  12.0%  12.8% 
 
A preliminary condition that need to be verified before analysing the possible 
determinants of liquidity constraints is the actual presence of some households 
constrained in their access to private services, by looking at “unadjusted” means in the 
different income quartiles. Tab. 2 shows the percentage of people (both healthy and ill)   16
that bought private health services in the twelve months prior to the interview in each of 
the four quartiles of the distribution by gross household income. Contrary to what one 
could expect, only in two countries, Italy and Spain, is this percentage clearly increasing 
from the poorest to the richest quartile. In some countries, in particular Denmark and 
Greece, the share of persons purchasing private services is actually negatively correlated 
with family income, probably because most of the individuals in bad health are also 
poor. These sample means are confirmed by considering the distribution of wealth, a 
proxy for the available resources to households that can be run down by sick people to 
pay for care (see e.g. Deaton and Paxson, 1998)
6. The only exception is the case of 
Netherlands, for which we now observe a gradient in the access to private health 
services (Tab. 3). 
 
Tab. 2 Percentage of people using private health services during  
previous 12 months, by non equivalent income quartiles 
 
  Sweden Denmark  Netherlands France Spain  Italy  Greece 
1  14.1 16.4  17.9  13.5 7.9  7.5  21.0 
2  17.6  14.1  15.9 11.7  10.3 9.0 18.2 
3  14.8 13.2  19.3  11.2 11.9 12.6 16.1 
4  16.8 13.9  15.2  11.1 15.3 18.5 18.7 
Total  15.8 14.4  17.1  11.9 11.4 11.9 18.5 
 
Tab. 3 Percentage of people using private health services during  
previous 12 months, by non equivalent wealth quartiles 
 
  Sweden Denmark  Netherlands France Spain  Italy  Greece 
1  13.4 14.0  15.3  14.6 9.4  7.6  16.1 
2  15.5 17.1  16.2  10.0 8.7  9.6  20.8 
3  16.5 12.9  17.1  12.2 14.7 12.1 18.6 
4  17.4 14.7  20.3  11.4 15.5 20.9 18.9 
Total  15.8 14.4  17.1  11.9 11.4 11.9 18.5 
 
Two conclusions arise from this evidence. First, the pattern of private health 
service use is very much differentiated across European countries. The view that private 
service are mainly consumed by rich people is, in general, not supported by these data. 
In some countries, however, private services actually seem to be purchased particularly 
by the rich: in Italy and Spain, the share of the first income quartile purchasing these 
                                                 
6 Accordingly, the definition of wealth considered here excludes the market value of the house owned by 
the respondents, since it could be difficult to sell.   17
services is less than half the share of the richest quartile. It follows that Italy and Spain 
may be the two ideal countries to consider for applying the CH methodology. Since the 
results obtained using non equivalent income are very similar to those computed by 
using wealth, in the remainder of the section we discuss only the former. 
 
Long-run and short-run constraints. In order to separate the effects of short-run and 
long-run constraints on the demand for private services, we apply the methodology 
described in section 3.1. In particular, we run Eq. (6) on each sub-sample of healthy and 
ill individuals for all the countries considered here. Overall, regression results seem to 
show a reasonable fit to the data, and regressors are always jointly statistically 
significant
7. As expected, the presence of a private insurance is almost always 
significantly and positively associated to the demand of private services across 
countries. Also the unavailability of services (because of distance and opening hours) is 
another significant determinant of demand. But apart from these two variables, no clear 
patterns emerge across countries: for instance, in Italy, age, gender, past employment 
and smoking behaviour are all significant factors in influencing demand (confirming 
previous findings by Propper, 2000); but the same is not true e.g. in Denmark, where 
only age is relevant. More importantly, dummies for income quartiles are significant 
only in few countries, suggesting that the role of credit constraints is not probably 
common across Europe. 
 
< Figure 1 about here > 
 
Figure 1 shows, for all countries, the estimates of the share of “constrained” 
individuals obtained by applying the CH method. For the two groups of ill and healthy 
persons, further divided into quartiles of gross household income, the figure contains 
the proportions of people purchasing private health services, both “unadjusted” (like the 
percentages reported in Tab. 1 and 2) and “adjusted” (i.e. using predicted values of 
regressions described in section 3.1). For Italy, the unadjusted data show that the share 
                                                 
7 Regressions results are not reported here for brevity, but are available upon request from the authors. P-
values of the F-tests associated to the regressions are included in the Appendix.   18
of people from the richest quartile purchasing private health services is, for the ill group, 
14 percentage points higher than for those in the first quartile, while for the healthy 
groups this difference amounts to 9 percentage points. After controlling for family 
characteristics, these differences drop to about 5 percentage points in both cases. This is 
a strong evidence in favour of the presence of both short-run and long-run constraints: 
the short-run constraints are evident from the differences between the adjusted means. 
For Italy, therefore, it seems that both short-run and long-run constraints are playing a 
role in determining the access to private health services. Morevoer, long-run family 
characteristics seem to explain a significant part of the gap in participation rates across 
income quartiles. The results for Spain are very similar to the Italian ones. In the 
Spanish case the gap in participation rates between the first and the richest quartile is 5 
points for the ill and almost 10 points for the healthy. These percentages, after the 
adjustment for structural family and environmental differences, reduce respectively to 
1.7 and 3.3 percentage points. 
 
Tab. 4 Proportion of individuals constrained and share of short-run constrained  
(All private services, 2003) 
  LR & SR constrained individuals  SR constrained 
 
% on all 
individuals  % on all users  % SR/(SR+LR)  % on all users 
(estimated) 
% on all 
individuals 
(self-perceived)
Sweden 1.08  1.27  22.45  0.29  3.24 
Denmark 1.64  1.95  38.00  0.74  1.64 
Netherlands 0.35  0.44 100.00  0.44  2.18 
France 0.67  0.95  41.76  0.40  5.74 
Spain 3.92  6.75  21.65  1.46  3.08 
Italy  6.85 10.71  52.45 5.62  5.08 
Greece 1.48  2.38  74.38 1.77  5.67 
 
To give a more precise account of the role of constraints, in Table 4 we report 
for all countries the percentage of constrained people, and - among them - the share of 
short-run constrained individuals, considering all private services. As anticipated, Italy 
and Spain seem to be the two countries where the share of constrained individuals, 
either in the long-run or the short-run, is significantly higher than in all the others. Also 
in Greece and Denmark some individuals are constrained, but to a lower degree. On the   19
contrary, the Netherlands appear the country with the lowest level of constrained 
individuals. Italy and Spain rank first for the role of constraints also when one considers 
the percentages of constrained individuals only on users of public or private health 
services. The percentage for Spain almost doubles, from 3.92 to 6.75, whilst for Italy, 
the percentage raises from 6.85 to 10.71. The impact of constraints is again the lowest 
in the Netherlands. The shares of short-run and log-run constrained individuals are 
different across countries. Combining the percentage of constrained individuals with 
this share, short-run constraints are more important in Italy and Greece, where 
respectively 5.62% and 1.77% of all users in the sample suffer from credit constraint 
according to the CH procedure. Notice that this ranking emerges also by considering the 
percentage of people who declared in the questionnaire to give up any types of care, 
because of the costs they would have to pay. This information is contained in the last 
column in Tab. 4. By comparing the number of estimated and self-perceived constrained 
individuals, the CH procedure seems to underestimate the role of constraints in the 
access to private care. The degree of underestimation is particularly strong for France, 
where 5.74% of individuals declared to be constrained, while our estimate was a mere 
0.28%. 
 
Extensions. Table 4 refers to results obtained by considering all private services and all 
individuals. We now extend these baseline results in two different ways: on the one 
hand by distinguishing different kinds of services, in particular considering dental care 
and care from a specialist physician, since we expect that short-run credit constraints 
may play a more relevant role in these particular sectors than on the whole set of private 
health services. There is ample evidence for instance that inequalities in oral health are 
marked by social class inequalities (e.g. Watt and Sheiham, 1999). On the other hand, 
we extend the analysis by looking at differences in gender, since the role of long-run 
and short-run constraints should be expected to be different for men and women, given 
the observed different access to care services between genders. 
As for the first route, by looking at dental care we obtain almost the same results 
as by considering all private health care services. Table 5 shows that the presence of 
constrained individuals (both in the short and the long-run) is the highest in Greece and   20
Italy (respectively 3.41% and 2.76%) and the lowest in Sweden (0.15%). These 
percentages worsen when one considers the number of users of dental care services 
(both public and private): in Greece and Italy, the percentage is well above 8%; in 
Spain, it reaches 7.26%. The importance of short-run constraints is larger in the three 
Mediterranean countries: in Italy, 6.02% of users are credit constrained in the access to 
private health care services. This percentage is 5.55% in Greece, and 3.28% in Spain; 
while for all the other countries the share of short-run constrained users is below 1%. As 
before, the share of constrained individuals is underestimated by the CH procedure. 
France and Sweden are the two countries where the differences appear to be the largest. 
 
Tab. 5 Proportion of individuals constrained and share of short-run constrained 
(Dental services, 2003) 
  LR & SR constrained individuals  SR constrained 
 
% on all 
individuals  % on all users  % SR/(SR+LR) % on all users 
(estimated) 
% on all 
individuals 
(self-perceived)
Sweden 0.15  0.20  100.00  0.20  2.26 
Denmark 1.33  1.77  52.41  0.93  0.63 
Netherlands  0.26 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.47 
France 0.63  1.47  20.86  0.31  2.97 
Spain 1.82  7.26  45.12  3.28  1.14 
Italy 2.76  8.63  69.78  6.02  1.42 
Greece 3.41  8.98  61.83 5.55  2.28 
 
A partially different picture emerges by considering visits at a specialist private 
physician. Table 6 shows that Italy and Spain rank again in the top positions when one 
look at all individuals. But taking into account only users, i.e. those persons that during 
the previous twelve month received care from a private or public specialist physician, 
also in Denmark and Sweden the share of constrained individuals is worrisome (8.54% 
and 4.76% respectively). The relatively high percentage of constrained individuals on 
private services users estimated for Denmark seems to be the result of the very low 
incidence of consumers for this type of services in the sample, both from public and 
private providers (17% against an overall mean of 43%). One possible interpretation 
relies on the institutional role assigned to General Practitioners in Denmark, who act as 
gatekeepers to the specialist services, even though in almost all countries people are   21
supposed to refer to a GP before consulting a specialist (e.g. Halldorsson et al., 2002). 
Notice also that for Denmark, as for most of the countries, all constrained individuals 
are short-run constrained, confirming worries about the role of age pension policies in 
eradicating inequalities in social democratic Welfare States (e.g. Dahl and Birkelund, 
1997). On the contrary, only in Italy and Spain most of constrained individuals are long-
run constrained. Finally, contrary to the case of all private services and dental care, now 
the CH procedure slightly overestimates the share of short-run constrained individuals 
for almost all countries. 
 
Tab. 6 Proportion of individuals constrained and share of short-run constrained 
(Care from specialist physician, 2003) 
  LR & SR constrained individuals  SR constrained 
 
% on all 
individuals  % on all users  % SR/(SR+LR) % on all users 
(estimated) 
% on all 
individuals 
(self-perceived)
Sweden 1.52  4.76  71.99  3.42  0.43 
Denmark 1.48  8.54  100  8.54  0.23 
Netherlands 0.24  0.67  100  0.67  0 
France 0.7  1.54  100  1.54  1.24 
Spain  1.89 4.92 11.6 0.57 0.94 
Italy  3.67 9.23 28.7 2.65 1.35 
Greece 0.75  2.20  100 2.20 1.49 
 
The second route we take extends our previous results by looking at gender 
differences. Separate results for women and men are collected in Table 7. Differences 
are significant. Consider Italy and Spain, the two countries where the percentages of 
constrained individuals are the highest: as for Italy, by looking at all individuals, the 
percentage of constrained women is 5.92 and the percentage of constrained men 7.23; in 
Spain, 1.34% of women and 4.39% of men are constrained. The situation in other 
countries is very similar: with the only exception of Greece, the percentage of 
constrained individuals is higher for men than for women. As for the role of long-run 
and short-run constraints, notice that both for Spain and Italy (the two countries where 
the problem is most severe), women are more likely to be long-run constrained, while 
men are more likely to be credit constrained. One possible interpretation of these 
findings relies on the biological role of women, that helps explain their higher usage of   22
health care services. Other gender specific factors influencing the access to services - 
and probably connected with reproductive biology - are related to different health 
perceptions and reporting of symptoms and illnesses, and to different probabilities of 
seeking help for prevention (see e.g. Bertakis et al., 2000). Indirect evidence on this 
point can be gauged also by looking at the role of mother’s education in explaining 
access to care of their children: low educated mothers have been shown to consistently 
reduce their children’s use of physician services (e.g. Halldorsson et al., 2002), 
suggesting that long-run constraints should be more important than credit constraints for 
women. 
 
Tab. 7 Proportion of individuals constrained and share of short-run constrained 
(All services by gender, 2003) 
  LR & SR constrained individuals 
 
% on all 
individuals  % on all users  % SR/(SR+LR) 
Sweden - women  0.24  0.31  100.00 
Sweden - men  1.43  1.81  36.00 
Denmark - women  0.29  0.37  100.00 
Denmark  - men  4.29  5.43  77.00 
Netherlands - women  0.29  0.37  100.00 
Netherlands  -men  0.8  1.01  88.00 
France - women  0.13  0.17  100.00 
France - men  2.09  2.64  58.00 
Spain - women  1.34  2.32  23.40 
Spain - men  4.39  7.56  55.19 
Italy – women  5.92  9.24  45.91 
Italy – men  7.23  12.83  52.53 
Greece - women  5.53  7.00  92.00 
Greece - men  1.01  1.27  29.00 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper aims at distinguishing long-run and short-run constraints in the access to 
private health care services, concentrating on a group of selected European countries. 
We depart from standard methodologies applied in the analysis of the causes of health 
inequalities, using instead the methodology proposed by CH to analyse the role of   23
family background and credit constraint in educational choices. This methodology is 
applied to the SHARE database, a survey conducted in a number of European countries 
(ranging from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean), involving some 22,000 individuals 
over the age of 50. Our results show that, contrary to what one could expect in the 
presence of a universal coverage publicly provided, there is evidence of constrained 
individuals in the access to private health care services, and the problem of short-run 
constraints could be real. This appears to be especially true in Italy, Greece, and to some 
extent Spain. Moreover, there appear to be differences in the role of credit constraints, 
both considering more specific services (e.g. dental care or specialist visits), and gender 
differences. 
That credit constraints appear to be important in Mediterranean-style Welfare 
States is a finding that deserves further investigation, and suggests the potential role of 
wide quality differences in the publicly provided services between different 
geographical areas of a country. Indeed, people living in areas where the quality of 
public care is inadequate should have one more reason to opt out for private care, but 
their access could be limited by the presence of liquidity constraints. Indirect evidence 
on this is available for Italy, where huge territorial differences exist in the quality of 
services produced by the NHS, and where the low quality of care has been shown to 
increase health inequalities at the local level (Jappelli et al., 2004). 
In a policy perspective, the presence of both long-run and short-run credit 
constraints calls for multi-faceted programs, aimed on the one hand at removing cash 
constraints, and on the other hand at addressing long-run factors affecting health. This 
conclusion is much in the vein of proposals advanced e.g. by two well known policy 
reports on inequalities in health in the UK (Department of Health and Social Security, 
1980; Department of Health, 1998), or by advocates of the “social determinants” of 
health (e.g. Wilkinson and Marmot, 2003). In other words, there seems to be a scope for 
simple cash transfers (or vouchers programs) in the countries where the problem of 
credit constraints appear to be most severe; but these transfers should be targeted toward 
the poorest individuals, integrating public pensions programs in the case of old age 
persons. Morevoer, beside these transfers, government need to implement preventive 
policies aimed at removing long-run constraints, such as those deriving from a poor   24
education or a poor family background. This calls for the interplay between health 
policies and other social policies, and the need to re-think a comprehensive strategy for 
a more effective Welfare State. 
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Tab. A1. P values of the F test for the country-level regressions,  
used to compute the values reported in Fig. 1 and Tab. 3 
 
Prob > F =  Ill  Healthy 
Sweden 0.0068  0.0000 
Denmark 0.0031  0.0458 
Netherlands 0.0001 0.0004 
France 0.0006  0.0089 
Spain 0.0000  0.0000 
Italy 0.0000  0.0000 
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